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Working Memory and Working Attention
What Could Possibly Evolve?
by C. Philip Beaman
The concept of “working” memory is traceable back to nineteenth-century theorists, but the term
itself was not used until the mid-twentieth century. A variety of different explanatory constructs have
since evolved that all make use of the working-memory label. This history is briefly reviewed, and
alternative formulations of working memory (as language processor, executive attention, and global
work space) are considered as potential mechanisms for cognitive change within and between in-
dividuals and between species. A means, derived from the literature on human problem solving, of
tracing memory and computational demands across a single task is described and applied to two
specific examples of tool use by chimpanzees and early hominids. The examples show how specific
proposals for necessary and/or sufficient computational and memory requirements can be more
rigorously assessed on a task-by-task basis. General difficulties in connecting cognitive theories (arising
from the observed capabilities of individuals deprived of material support) with archaeological data
(primarily remnants of material culture) are discussed.
Perhaps the earliest systematic division between primary
memory, or the “extended present,” and a secondary memory
knowledge base was made by James (1890). James contrasted
the subjective feeling of immediate awareness associated with
the recent past with the sense of search or recollection as-
sociated with recall of events from further back in time. This
subjective distinction between memory for those recent items
or events that are immediately available quickly persuaded
many theorists that measurement of the span or capacity of
an immediate-access, short-term store might provide a direct
route to measurement of intellectual ability (e.g., Baldwin
1894), and working-memory (principally digit) “span” tasks
remain a feature of modern IQ tests, such as the Wechsler
Adult Intelligence Scale.
By far the most influential model of working memory in
the tradition of James (1890) is the eponymous working-
memory model of Baddeley and Hitch (1974; Baddeley 1986,
2007), which draws heavily on research using digit span and
related measurement techniques. The model proposes sepa-
rate storage systems for verbal and visuospatial information
(the phonological loop and the visuospatial sketch pad) over-
seen by a control structure (the central executive). Both sys-
tems are considered to consist of a passive storage component
of relatively unprocessed material (the phonological store and
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the visual cache, respectively) from which information quickly
decays (in a period of 1.5–2 seconds from the phonological
store; Baddeley 1986:192–196) unless covertly rehearsed by a
motor program (such as subvocal or articulatory rehearsal of
verbal information). Recently, the importance of integrating
information from different sensory modalities has been rec-
ognized with the introduction of an “episodic buffer” (Bad-
deley 2000). However, the term “working memory” is of in-
dependent origin and was not originally linked either to
memory for particular types of information or storage of a
particular type (for additional “narrow” and “broad” defi-
nitions of working memory, see Wynn and Coolidge 2010, in
this issue).
The phrase “working memory” was introduced by Miller,
Galanter, and Pribram (1960) to support their concept of
“Plans” as hierarchical processes controlling the order in
which a sequence of operations is performed (Miller, Galanter,
and Pribram 1960:16). Miller, Galanter, and Pribram (1960)
speculate that “the parts of a Plan that is being executed have
special access to consciousness and special ways of being re-
membered. . . . We should like to speak of the memory we
use for the execution of our Plans as a kind of quick-access,
‘working memory’” (65). Thus, this original definition was
entirely functional—a “special state or place” where a Plan is
remembered while being executed and is explicitly disengaged
from a wholly biological interpretation (“The special place
may be on a sheet of paper”), although, of course, biological
instantiations are not ruled out (“Or—who knows?—it may
be somewhere in the frontal lobes of the brain”; Miller, Gal-
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anter, and Pribram 1960:65). This latter instantiation has a
distinctly modern feel to it.
The utilization of a nonbiological substrate to act as a work-
ing memory has been largely ignored by psychologists inspired
by Baddeley’s (1986, 2007) model of essentially sensory-based
internal systems. It does, however, have an obvious connec-
tion with material remains of ancient mnemonic and com-
putational aids that have been linked to cognitive evolution
(e.g., Donald 1991; Renfrew and Scarre 1998). The identifi-
cation of such artifacts dates the appearance of a metacog-
nitive awareness of the insufficiency of the internalized set of
storage systems available for use as working memories
(d’Errico 2001; Marshak 1972, 1991), with artificial memory
systems claimed for at least as far back as the beginning of
the Upper Paleolithic (d’Errico 1998). Working memory in
the sense of Miller, Galanter, and Pribram (1960) is also used
in artificial intelligence (AI) research to designate a compo-
nent of a “production system” computer program intended
to model some aspect of human cognition, notably learning
and problem solving (Anderson 2005; Newell 1990). In AI
terminology, the working memory of a production system
holds awareness of the current state of the world, including
information regarding the status of current goals or plans.
Thus, at minimum, two different concepts of working mem-
ory exist: a sensory-specific, short-term code subject to decay
(Baddeley) and a goal stack recording progress toward a def-
inite end (Miller, Galanter, and Pribram 1960).
A third, and more recent, conception of working memory
is as a system of attentional focus. The key idea here is that
the capability to focus attention on task-relevant material and
prohibit the processing of task-irrelevant material underpins
performance on a large number of cognitive tasks, including
tests of reasoning and fluid intelligence (Conway, Kane, and
Engle 2003). Some researchers (e.g., Cowan 2005) consider
focus of attention to be fixed at a given value. Cowan (2001,
2005) provides an extended argument that only four items at
once can be held within the focus of attention (Miller’s [1956]
earlier and larger estimate of requires the utilization of7 2
more, and more variable, mnemonic strategies; Cowan,
Morey, and Chen 2007). Cowan also considers this value to
be relatively invariant (1) within Homo sapiens. Other the-
orists, however, argue that a specific ability to control atten-
tion determines the capacity of a working memory. For ex-
ample, individual differences in scores on complex
working-memory span tasks—tasks that require simulta-
neous, or near-simultaneous, storage and processing (for a
full account, see Conway et al. 2005)—correlate with perfor-
mance on a broad range of high-level cognitive tasks (Conway,
Kane, and Engle 2003; Kane and Engle 2002; Kane et al. 2007)
and provide the basis for assuming that whatever the complex
span tasks measure has some definite and important
functionality.
Cowan’s (2005) view of a fixed attentional focus is not
necessarily inconsistent with the controlled or “executive at-
tention” idea, as Cowan’s model also allows for an activated
portion of long-term memory outside the focus of attention
to act as a short-term store. Attention is directed or controlled
by an executive component similar to that proposed by Bad-
deley (1986), and the sum total of focal attention plus acti-
vation of long-term memory could provide the working-
memory span measured by Kane, Engle, and colleagues (Engle
2010, in this issue; Kane and Engle 2002; Kane et al. 2007).
Thus, under current consideration for the role of primary
driver of human cognitive evolution are three dissociable the-
oretical constructs: the material-specific, dedicated working-
memory systems proposed by Baddeley (1986, 2007); the ge-
neric and functionally defined “working memories” of Miller,
Galanter, and Pribram (1960); and the increases in cognitive
capability allowed by more efficient cognitive control of focal
attention (Engle 2010; Kane and Engle 2002; Kane et al. 2007).
Dedicated working-memory systems (Baddeley 1986, 2000,
2007) and efficient control of focal attention (Engle 2010;
Kane and Engle 2002; Kane et al. 2007) comprise systems
internal to the organism, whereas functionally defined work-
ing memories (Miller, Galanter, and Pribram 1960) could be
internal or external in nature. These possibilities will be de-
bated in turn, but first the prima facie case for any kind of
memory improvement as a driver of cognitive evolution is
considered.
The Appeal of Working Memory
for Cognitive Evolution
An internalized working memory was feted by Goldman-
Rakic (1992) as “perhaps the most significant achievement of
human mental evolution” (111), but the idea of internalized
working memory as a single explanatory concept has also
received criticism. Neath (2000) complains that the term
“working memory” not only has lost its utility but also is
potentially misleading. In a similar vein, Rabbitt (2001) has
pointed out that the different versions of working memory
proposed by various theorists are invoked as explanations for
almost all research topics in cognitive psychology, while the
term “working memory” remains elastic enough that several
different “final” solutions to each of these topics have been
proposed, each under the rubric of working memory. While
the case is perhaps overstated, Rabbitt’s point, that the term
“working memory” loses explanatory force if used to support
several mutually exclusive interpretations, is well taken. One
researcher’s model of how this enables higher cognitive func-
tion may differ drastically from another’s, and yet both are
subsumed under the same working-memory label despite be-
ing derived from different experimental situations and applied
to different cognitive functions.
Given this, it is clearly necessary to indicate what is meant
by “working memory” before the suggestion that its enhance-
ment drives advances in cognitive evolution can be evaluated.
First, whatever is meant must be human specific in order to
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rate consideration. One recent study demonstrated superior
immediate recall for the spatial positioning of digits among
chimpanzees than among college students (Inoue and Mat-
suzawa 2007), so presumably this form of spatial/symbolic
memory is ruled out of consideration on a priori grounds.
Even an identifiable, human-specific mechanism holding ma-
terial for subsequent processing need not necessarily reflect
an evolved and dedicated “working”-memory system, how-
ever. For example, Reisberg, Rappaport, and O’Shaughnessy
(1984) showed that mechanisms suitable for temporary main-
tenance can be conjured up or co-opted from existing re-
sources. Reisberg, Rappaport, and O’Shaughnessy (1984) were
able to increase individuals’ digit span by teaching them a
mapping between the numbers 1–10 and each of their fingers.
Tapping their fingers in sequence enabled these individuals,
when prompted to recall, to expand their “verbal” digit span
beyond the normally expected (Miller 1956). The per-7 2
formance increase is clearly the consequence of co-opting an
extant motor system in the service of the memory task. It is
not clear whether the digit-motor span used in this case
should be considered a part of the working-memory model
as defined by Baddeley (1986, 2007), although it is unlikely
to be the type of system one would wish to consider evolving
and driving subsequent cognitive advance; rather, it is most
likely a consequence of such advance.
One way of proceeding is to consider the a priori reasons,
some of which are enumerated by Coolidge and Wynn (2001,
2004), why memory systems might be implicated in the course
of cognitive evolution. The most obvious reason for consid-
ering memory to be the driver of cognitive evolution is the
simple observation that the memory space available defines
the type of information-processing operations that are pos-
sible in principle. Thus, a Turing machine (with infinite mem-
ory) is a more powerful device than a linear-bounded autom-
aton (with finite memory), which in turn is more powerful
than a push-down automaton (with access only to the top
register of the memory stack), which is more powerful than
a finite-state automaton (with no memory). By “more pow-
erful,” I mean that it is mathematically proven that the device
is in principle capable of more and different computations
(Turing 1936). Chomsky demonstrated that the output of
each of these devices can be described by a grammar (the
Chomsky hierarchy) and that human languages require—at
minimum—the rules of a context-sensitive grammar, which
can be produced (and processed) only by a device or organism
with memory capabilities comparable to those of a linear-
bounded automaton or a Turing machine (Chomsky 1957,
1959; for an account couched in terms of the evolution of
language, see Nowak, Komarorva, and Niyogi 2002). Assum-
ing that only a particular subset of memory, the working
memory, is to be found engaging in online cognitive tasks
therefore makes the characteristics and capacity of this system
of critical importance in determining the information-
processing capabilities of the organism, particularly with re-
gard to language learning and usage.
Two further reasons for examining working memory as a
driver of cognitive evolution are advanced by Coolidge and
Wynn (2004). These are that the capacity of working memory
is of “appropriate magnitude” to allow sophisticated cognitive
abilities—such as contingency planning, innovation, and
analogy—and that working memory is heritable. The as-
sumption of magnitude is obviously the presumption that
working memory is the memory system required for flexible
information processing, as required by the theory of com-
putability (Turing 1936). The heritability of working memory,
however, is less informative with regard to cognitive evolution
because, to take a strictly Popperian approach to scientific
practice, the working-memory hypothesis cannot be falsified
by heritability estimates. Heritability, variation due to genetic
influence, is distinct from genetic determination, and either
or both could be responsible for a cognitive enhancement of
some kind in the evolutionary past.
A further and perhaps more helpful rationale for consid-
ering working memory as a contributory factor to cognitive
evolution is as a basis for integrating information from several
sources and as an enabler of other cognitive capabilities. In-
tegration of information allows analogies to be drawn across
domains, referred to by Mithen (1996) as “cognitive fluidity.”
For example, Baddeley (2000) suggested that the integration
of information could be thought of as occurring in an “ep-
isodic buffer.” Similarly, in the integrated theory of the mind
in Anderson et al. (2004), there is a central matching and
selection process associated with the basal ganglia that relates
incoming information from perceptual modules and stored
information from long-term memory to current goals, the
system as a whole functioning as a working memory in the
sense of Miller, Galanter, and Pribram (1960) and imple-
mented computationally as a production system.
Integration of information directly enables cognitive ca-
pabilities, but indirect effects of an enhancement of working
memory should also be considered. That is, not only should
the direct benefits of a more efficient online processor be rec-
ognized but also the possible benefits of such a system as an
enabler of further cognitive development must also be as-
sessed. At this point, theories of cognition can make contact
with artifacts that may themselves be products of an “enabled”
cognitive system. The most obvious way in which working
memory could enable cognition, and a route considered by
Baddeley (2007), is in the evolution of language.
Working Memory and the
Evolution of Language
Because the phonological loop component in Baddeley’s
working-memory model is held to be responsible for main-
taining speech-based information over the short term, the
idea that an enhancement of phonological storage is a re-
quirement for complex language to develop is seductive
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(Coolidge and Wynn 2004, 2007) and would prima facie seem
to fit with the computational analysis of the memory re-
quirements of language. However, the overemphasis on pho-
nological memory is misguided in this case. Beaman (2007)
reviewed neuropsychological evidence that brain-damaged
patients with defective phonological storage show only subtle
speech comprehension deficits. These occur only when some
form of error correction is necessary for long and involved
sentences. Such patients also do not necessarily show speech
production deficits, querying the necessity for capacious pho-
nological storage to support speech processing (see also Bad-
deley 2007:16). The use of exclusively neuropsychological data
in this review was questioned (Coolidge and Wynn 2007),
but it is possible to provide converging evidence from other
sources that extended phonological storage is not particularly
important for speech processing.
First, from computational models of sentence processing
it has been shown that phonological memory per se is not
necessary to replicate human-style complex sentence pro-
cessing if other working-memory buffers, each of extremely
limited capacity (one item), can be employed (Lewis and
Vasishth 2005; Lewis, Vasishth, and Van Dyke 2006). Second,
there is ample evidence (Kutas and Federmeier 2000; Marslen-
Wilson 1987; Moss, McCormick, and Tyler 1997) that humans
access meaning very quickly, beginning in the region of the
first 150 milliseconds of the word (a single-syllable consonant-
vowel-consonant word takes up to 300–400 milliseconds to
produce at normal speaking rate). Visual recognition accesses
meaning even faster (Grill-Spector and Kanwisher 2005).
There is thus no need to use phonological memory because
the basis for speech comprehension as lexico-semantic and
syntactic codes are as readily available, and arguably more
useful, than phonological codes. This is fortunate, as Baddeley
(1986) estimates that the phonological component of his
working-memory model remains available for only 1.5–2 sec-
onds unless rehearsed by a late-developing and effortful sub-
vocal articulation process. This assessment of capacity limit
further suggests that phonological memory per se is not of
sufficient magnitude to enable cognitive advance.1
An alternative account is presented by Jacquemot and Scott
(2006; see also Buchsbaum and D’Esposito 2008; Jones,
Macken, and Nicholls 2004) in which speech memory is cou-
pled to a speech output buffer, with the two components
ordinarily acting as a functional unit. This explains why neu-
ropsychological patients with deficits in short-term memory
for speech sounds do not necessarily show speech production
errors because the speech output buffer may be unaffected.
Language processing is dependent on more than memory for
speech sounds, however, which is why working-memory
(phonological storage) deficits can have but little effect on
1. Verbal memory is more prolonged than this limited capacity, but
according to Baddeley’s model, this extended capacity either relies on
other codes (Baddeley 2000, 2007) or is dependent on articulatory re-
hearsal, an optional strategy considered slow to develop (Baddeley 1986).
everyday language comprehension. The focus on phonology
reflects the seductive hypothesis that speech sounds are in
some way special despite a lack of supporting evidence (Fitch,
Hauser, and Chomsky 2005; Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch
2002; Yip 2006). For example, Coolidge and Wynn (2007)
suggest that phonological memory is a necessary prerequisite
for recursion. This is a straightforward statement about the
memory requirements for the appropriate classification of a
recursive grammar within the Chomsky hierarchy, but the
memory in question need not be phonological. Recursion
does not require specifically phonological storage as claimed
by Coolidge and Wynn (2007; incorrectly ascribed to Hauser
et al. 2002) because it is simply a self-referential computa-
tional procedure that results in an iterative or symmetrical
pattern (e.g., Corballis 2007). Recursion in language and mu-
sic was long thought uniquely human (Fitch and Hauser 2004;
Hauser et al. 2002), but European starlings have recently been
observed to show awareness of a recursive syntax for acoustic
patterns (sufficient to allow the embedding of relative clauses;
Gentner et al. 2006). This interpretation is controversial (Cor-
ballis 2007)—and the starlings required a large number of
trials to demonstrate even limited sensitivity to recursion—
but the study shows that recursion is not necessarily limited
to phonological memory and possibly not even to human
cognition.
An alternative role for phonological memory in human
evolution is as an enabler of language acquisition. A case can
be made that phonological memory is required for vocabulary
acquisition (Baddeley 2007; Baddeley, Gathercole, and Pa-
pagno 1998) on the basis that neuropsychological patients
with impaired auditory-verbal storage fail to learn new pho-
nological forms and also because nonword repetition, a de-
velopmental measure of phonological memory, predicts chil-
dren’s later vocabulary size (reviews by Baddeley, Gathercole,
and Papagno [1998]; Gathercole [2006]). Furthermore, en-
docast analysis indicates that the parietal regions, the brain
regions primarily associated with phonological storage (and
damaged in short-term-memory patients), differ between
modern and archaic specimens (Bruner 2004). However, there
is at least one recorded case of impaired phonological storage
in an individual who appears to have shown no difficulties
in acquiring his native tongue (Baddeley 2003). Finally, the
nonword repetition task requires only the immediate repe-
tition of a single one- or two-syllable nonsense word of ca.
350–750 milliseconds duration, so although there is a clear
storage requirement, it is of the kind that can be accomplished
by an extremely limited (one item) buffer store of the kind
envisaged by Anderson et al. (2004) or an extremely limited
duration store as proposed by Baddeley (1986). Thus, al-
though working memory of some kind is required for lan-
guage acquisition, the limited phonological storage ability
available cannot be considered “enhanced” relative to other
hominids or to nonhuman primates, and the putative ex-
pansion of the parietal regions may be plausibly an effect
rather than a cause of language development.
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Working Memory and
Working Attention
If phonological working memory need not be particularly
large to enable vocabulary acquisition and speech processing,
what other high-level cognitive capabilities are associated with
some measure of working-memory capacity? The so-called
executive functions associated with the prefrontal cortex are
frequently cited as the basis of higher-level cognitive capa-
bilities in modern neuropsychological studies (e.g., Rabbitt
1997) and are associated also with working memory (Kane
and Engle 2002). On purely cognitive grounds, the focus of
attention is of particular interest. This may be characterized
in two ways: either as Cowan’s (2005) fixed-capacity atten-
tional spotlight or as Kane and Engle’s “executive attention,”
short-term memory capacity plus executive control (Kane et
al. 2007). Focal attention, the number of items that can be
“held in mind” at one time, is estimated as invariant at about
four items (Cowan 2001, 2005), and this could perhaps have
expanded from a lower value during the Paleolithic. However,
Cowan’s attentional focus can be ruled out as the origin of
behavioral modernity. The value of four items was identified
based on, among other evidence, the number of items an
individual can “subitize” (enumerate immediately without
consciously counting). Consistent with this, Tuholski, Engle,
and Baylis (2001) showed that the slope of reaction time to
identify the number of items up to three is flat, and beyond
this there is a significant quadratic function where subitizing
(and hence the focus of attention) is no longer sufficient.
However, Murofushi (1997) previously reported an identical
pattern in the chimpanzee, demonstrating that nonhuman
primates have the same four-item capacity for focal attention
as Homo sapiens, thus ruling it out as the cognitive basis of
modernity.
Kane and Engle’s (2002) idea of executive attention is a
more serious competitor. “Executive attention” is an umbrella
term for processes that help maintain or recover access to the
memory items in the absence of focal attention or effective
rehearsal strategies, for example, when a concurrent process-
ing task prevents attentional focus remaining on the memory
items (Kane et al. 2007). The behavioral task believed to tap
this capability is the complex working-memory span task in
which participants are required to retain and then recall a
sequence of words in order when demanding processing tasks
(e.g., verifying arithmetic expressions) are interleaved between
the presentation of the words. An impressive set of data has
been collected showing that complex working-memory span
predicts individual differences on a wide range of high-level
cognitive tasks (Kane and Engle 2002; Kane et al. 2007). For
example, in the subitizing task mentioned above, there were
significant differences between high- and low-span human
participants in the speed with which they identified the num-
ber of items when that number was beyond three and subi-
tizing was therefore no longer sufficient.
A further and arguably more impressive example comes
from a study by Hambrick and Engle (2002) contrasting the
effects of age, expertise, and working memory on recall of a
baseball commentary. In this study, neither age nor expertise
eliminated the effects of working-memory capacity, with high-
span participants reliably at the same constant advantage rel-
ative to low-span participants despite equivalent advantages
of accrued expertise or decrements due to age. Crucially, how-
ever, working-memory span did not interact with expertise;
high-span experts were at the same advantage over low-span
experts as high-span novices were over low-span novices. Ex-
pertise did not diminish this advantage, but neither was there
any runaway effect of working-memory span such that the
gap between the high- and low-span individuals widened with
expertise. Differences in working-memory span thus convey
a consistent and constant advantage that evolution could,
presumably, work with, but in this study, at least, there was
no sign that the differences in working memory observed
provided the basis for a step change in cognitive capability
as characterizes the shift within the fossil record from archaic
(e.g., Oldowan) technologies to those that signal the advent
of behaviorally modern humans.
One possibility, of course, is that the step change occurred
in evolutionary time and the differences in working-memory
capacity within a modern human population are small by
comparison—too small to interact with other advantages and
enable high-capacity individuals to outstrip their low-capacity
competitors by an ever-increasing margin. By this account,
the shared (high) level of working-memory capacity in a mod-
ern human population is a more important source of cog-
nitive capability than any current individual differences
among working-memory scores. In this case, however, it is
unclear whether complex working-memory span tasks (or
similar psychometric measures) are informative with regard
to cognitive evolution, as, by design, they record the effects
of differences between individuals rather than the effects of
elements common to all. As such, without a better model of
the mechanism involved, it is not clear whether the differ-
entiating elements of the span task are picking up on the
more efficient use of a single system or whether the species-
common capability is actually a different system or process
from that measured by the individual difference scores (Bors-
boom and Dolan 2006).
Working Memory and the
Pursuit of Goals
To summarize, two internalized views of working memory
have been considered. The idea of an enhanced phonological
storage component can be rejected as unnecessary for the
development and comprehension of language; although the
neuropsychological data suggest that some such storage is
required, the capacity and duration of this storage need only
be quite restricted. A domain-general-executive-attention
mechanism distinguishes between low- and high-capacity in-
dividuals on a number of high-level cognitive tasks and there-
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Figure 1. Adaptive control of thought-rational (ACT-R) model 6.0 (ver-
sion from 2007). The core of the model is the relationship between the
goal buffer (a kind of working memory in the sense of Miller, Galanter,
and Pribram 1960), the declarative module, and the procedural system.
Other modules that may be viewed as similar to Baddeley’s (1986) “slave”
systems also serve as temporary maintenance devices, but each is of
extremely limited capacity.
fore remains a possibility as a necessary development for cog-
nitive evolution to progress. However, it is unclear whether
such a mechanism is sufficient to account for the emergence
of behavioral modernity among anatomically modern Homo
sapiens. The third alternative is the development of a more
general “working”-memory system in the sense of Miller, Gal-
anter, and Pribram (1960), of allowing quick access to goal-
relevant information. The distinction between this and ex-
ecutive attention is subtle but informative: executive attention
refers to the ability to maintain goal-relevant information in
the presence of irrelevant distracters (Kane and Engle 2002;
Kane et al. 2007; although not all distractions are suppressed
by high-span individuals [Beaman 2004]) and is a capability
associated with the control functions of the prefrontal cortex.
The more general view makes no reference to the requirement
to inhibit task-irrelevant distracters and allows for the locus
of the information to be based either internally or externally.
The most detailed modern version of such a view is the
adaptive control of thought-rational (ACT-R) model devised
by Anderson and colleagues as an integrated model of cog-
nition (Anderson 2005, 2007; Anderson et al. 2004). A “uni-
fied” model of cognition such as this has the advantage that
it is possible to relate such things as the capacity of working-
memory buffers to performance on complex cognitive tasks
and to restrict cognitive capabilities by enforcing or relaxing
such constraints (Anderson and Lebiere 2003; Cooper 2002;
Cooper et al. 1996; Newell 1990). ACT-R is employed here
as an exemplar of what might be achieved without any nec-
essary commitment to its detailed assumptions.
Each of the buffers in Anderson’s ACT-R model is of re-
stricted (one item) capacity, so any evolved enhancement
must be associated either with the development of new buffers
(cf. Barnard 2010, in this issue; Barnard et al. 2007) or some
other factor. In the current version, the goal module, which
drives behavior, is assumed to be located within the anterior
cingulate cortex. A further control structure is the declarative
module, and the means by which the system communicates
information about progress toward the goal is via the basal
ganglia, a subcortical structure that maps cortical buffers to
each other (see fig. 1).
The basal ganglia is the central bottleneck in information
processing according to this theory, a position that has re-
cently received support (McNab and Klingberg 2007; for a
related theory, see also Hazy, Frank, and O’Reilly 2007). How-
ever, although it plays a critical integrative function and hence
acts in many ways as the nucleus of a “global work space,”
it is not a candidate for the basis of cognitive evolution. First,
it is an evolutionarily old structure critical for basic as well
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as advanced functions. Second, it maintains no memory
buffer itself (in this respect it resembles Baddeley’s concept
of a central executive, except that its role is communication
rather than management). Enhancement via cognitive evo-
lution can therefore occur within this system only if the com-
munication system is made more efficient (in terms of speed
and fidelity of transmission, as seems to have happened earlier
in mammalian evolution) or if previously separate cognitive
modules are connected together to work in concert toward a
centrally represented goal. Differences in speed of commu-
nication (speed of processing) have been implicated in studies
of individual differences in modern human intelligence (e.g.,
Anderson 1992), but these will not be considered here. Like-
wise, the possibilities of evolving new modules and connecting
these to a central engine of cognition are also sufficiently
familiar (e.g., Barnard 2010; Barnard et al. 2007; Mithen 1996)
to require no further consideration at this point.
Arguably, the most interesting area of speculation concerns
memory for current goals. Anderson (2005, 2007) speculates
that the goal module enables disengagement from basic wants
and drives (goals) and focuses on something else (the means).
That is, it allows the individual to disengage the immediate
circumstances as experienced and consider how to create
something more desirable. Previous theorists (e.g., Papineau
2001) have suggested that means-end reasoning of this type
distinguishes human from nonhuman reasoning, and early
pioneers in the psychology of human problem solving likewise
focused on the ability to perform means-end analysis (Newell
and Simon 1972). Means-end analysis differs from simpler
forms of problem solving in requiring an ability to form and
maintain subgoals. It is also a more powerful form of problem
solving than simpler alternatives, such as difference reduction,
because the flexibility of means-end analysis allows the means
to become (temporarily) the end. In contrast, difference re-
duction involves making incremental steps to reduce the dif-
ference between the current state and the goal state. Although
this approach is frequently used in human problem solving,
it causes problems when all courses of action appear to lead
away from the goal state. Jeffries et al. (1977) observed the
use of difference reduction in the well-known hobbits and
orcs (previously missionaries and cannibals) river-crossing
problem. In this study, about one-third of participants chose
to undo their previous move rather than take a move that
seemed to be a movement away from the solution (i.e., violate
difference reduction). Reluctance to abandon difference re-
duction can make some problems unsolvable. MacGregor,
Ormerod, and Chronicle (2001) suggested that insight into
the nine-dot problem, a particularly difficult problem that
requires creative insight to solve, is impeded by use of dif-
ference reduction and limited look-ahead. Faced with the lim-
itations of difference reduction, Newell and Simon (1972)
suggested that human cognition might follow the principle
of means-end analysis as follows: (1) set up a goal or subgoal;
(2) look for a difference between the current state and the
goal or subgoal; (3) look for a procedure, including setting a
subgoal, that will reduce or eliminate this difference; (4) apply
the procedure; (5) repeat steps 2–4 until the final goal is
achieved.
It would be of interest to examine the archaeological record
to determine what patterns of behavior can be identified that
are unlikely to emerge in the absence of means-end analysis
(Mithen 1990). However, it seems implausible that the con-
struction of any material artifact or technological culture of
any complexity would be possible in the absence of some
degree of subgoaling. Means-end analysis per se is therefore
an implausible candidate for the basis of behavioral moder-
nity. However, the extent to which subgoals can be maintained
and the motivation for doing so are both worthy of further
examination.
The extent to which goals and subgoals are maintained is
a critical feature of cognitive control, albeit one that has gen-
erated empirical research only recently. The parent goal must
be maintained while subgoals are formed and achieved (the
declarative module is used for this; Anderson 2007), otherwise
a prolonged sequence of coherent action would not be pos-
sible. Goal stacks are employed in AI research as a program-
ming convenience; however, there are indications that sub-
goals and their resolution correspond to some psychological
reality and have measurable behavioral consequences (An-
derson, Kushmerick, and Lebiere 1993). The depths to which
subgoaling might proceed and the possibility that goal mem-
ory, like other forms of memory, might be susceptible to
interference and forgetting have only just begun to be ex-
plored (Altmann 2002; Altmann and Trafton 2002). Failure
to subgoal has, however, long been associated with the per-
formance of neuropsychological patients with frontal lobe
damage on tasks requiring advanced planning (e.g., Goel, Pul-
lara, and Grafman 2001). A restriction on the depth to which
one can subgoal, or the extent to which parent goals can be
maintained while pursuing subgoals, is likely to have a pro-
found effect on the mental operations for which one is ad-
equately equipped. The latter situation, for example, virtually
defines the difference between high- and low-working-
memory-span individuals in the executive-attention theory
of Kane, Engle, and colleagues (Kane and Engle 2002; Kane
et al. 2007).
The analysis of behavior in terms of necessary subgoals is
also conceptually similar to the “conigram” representations
introduced by Haidle (2010, in this issue), but it can result
in different conclusions. Two examples illustrate the relation-
ship. Haidle presents a conigram for the use of a tool set to
extract termites by Pan troglodytes and a further conigram for
the use of an Oldowan tool to cut meat. Both examples are
presented in terms of a main goal and three subgoals (sub-
problems) that are solved in turn over seven different phases.
These behavior patterns can also be analyzed using techniques
from the literature on human problem solving to suggest how
the problem space is traversed and the goal state attained. In
simplified form, a part of the termite extraction task might
be expressed using production (if-then) rules as follows:
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Set a goal to obtain termites
IF goal(termites)
and inaccessible(nest)
THEN set a goal to open the nest
IF goal(open,nest)
and not available(probe)






and the goal is satisfied








and the goal is satisfied
This quasi formalism represents a much-reduced and sim-
plified version of the task (e.g., the search for a stick, a non-
trivial task in itself, is omitted) for purposes of space and
clarity, but, nevertheless, by indenting the formation of the
subgoals, the recursive nature of the problem solving and the
number of goals that must be maintained simultaneously in
working memory become more immediately apparent (no
more than three at any one time in order to satisfy the main
goal). It is also worth noting that by representing the skill set
(the operations conducted in the THEN part of the rule) as
responding directly to currently perceived requirements (the
IF part of the rule), the need for forward planning and other
“executive” functions is revealed as potentially lower than that
suggested by Haidle (2010). Compare the above with the
(again, much simplified) minimal set of production rules nec-
essary to begin to use an Oldawan tool to cut meat:




THEN set a goal to cut the meat
IF goal(cut,meat)
and not available(cutting_tool)












In comparison with the procedure for using a single tool
to obtain termites, even in simplified and much-curtailed
form, this second algorithm requires a minimum of four sub-
goals to be held in mind simultaneously to reach the point
of beginning to knap the putative tool with the hammer stone
(how many further subgoals are then required to work the
stone is unclear). This is because of the iterative depth of the
procedure—each application of an operator required to reach
a subgoal adds that subgoal onto the stack of elements to be
held simultaneously “in” working memory. Subdividing a task
into the subgoals necessary to reach the goal state by means-
end analysis thus reveals the complexity of some superficially
simple tasks (and P. troglodytes are revealed as recursive
means-end reasoners). More pertinently, the load on working
memory (in the sense of Miller, Galanter, and Pribram 1960,
although not necessarily in the senses of Baddeley 2007 or
Engle 2010) is shown to be, not surprisingly, higher for hom-
inid production of Oldawan tools than for the chimpanzee’s
use of sticks to obtain termites. The general view that Ol-
dowan stone tool production is behaviorally more complex
than probing a nest of termites with a stick and chisel is, of
course, consistent with Haidle’s (2010) analysis, but the de-
composition of the task into a set of subgoals reached by
means of applying well-defined procedures suggests that the
relative contribution made by memory per se is greater than
is obvious from a cognigram. Advanced planning and exec-
utive control might, in consequence, be less necessary. This
is especially the case if the computational demands on the
individual can be lessened by considering how the physical
and social environments might support and hence simplify
some of these procedures (e.g., the presence of perforators
next to termite nests in the first example; for examples from
cognitive science, see also Brooks 1991; Kotovsky, Hayes, and
Simon 1984; Simon 1992). Further analysis of the knapping
procedure itself is also doubtless possible but requires further
study, and the task is also likely to require the involvement
of visual/motor modules to track progress at the task toward
the eventual goal (Stout et al. 2008).
The motivation for pursuing subgoals as well as the ability
to do so is an issue that is also worth pursuing for its own
sake. The cognitive science of planning and problem solving
has largely focused on “cold” (unemotional, propositional)
cognition that lends itself to computational modeling, but
arguably the defining features of behavioral modernity are
associated with “hot” (emotional, meaning-laden) cognition
(P. Barnard, personal communication) or, as Mithen (1996)
depicts it, the beginnings of art, religion, and science. These
activities, which are pursued for their own sake rather than
to advance some longer-term goal, are more associated in the
literature with decision making than with problem solving
and with ventromedial rather than dorsolateral areas of the
prefrontal cortex. At first blush, many of these more plea-
surable aspects of modern life (art, music), taken for granted
within both urban and hunter-gatherer societies, seem entirely
useless from a strict evolutionary viewpoint. However, the
point is not whether art or music itself fulfills an evolutionary
purpose but rather whether the motivation toward music—
or any other seemingly nonadaptive goal—is reinforceable.
Beaman Working Memory and Working Attention S35
Although it is difficult to trace the emergence of music in the
archaeological record, the emergence of behavioral modernity
is indicated by the appearance of traits that reveal the presence
of symbolic thought that—by themselves—may convey little
or no obvious evolutionary advantage. Thus, although some
forms of technological advance (e.g., in the design of hand-
axes) show obvious survival advantages, other indicators of
behavioral modernity, such as the appearance of cave art,
provide no such succor. Self-rewarding activities such as art,
craft, ritual, and music may have been subject to the rigors
of sexual selection (e.g., Miller 2000), but something must
have initiated this in the first instance. The motivational sys-
tem that led to the conception and execution of such un-
dertakings, coupled with the ability to represent subgoals and
indulge in means-end analysis, would seem to provide the
necessary mechanism to pursue these activities.
Hot Cognition and the Establishment
of Goals in Working Memory
In brief, the current suggestion is that something must act to
provide a goal and the motivation to reach that goal must be
maintained as well as the goal itself. The traditional analysis
of problem-solving behavior within cognitive science assumes
that subgoals are merely stepping-stones on the way to a
parent goal as defined by the programmer (AI research) or
the experimenter (cognitive psychology). Outside of these
highly unusual settings, however, both goals and subgoals are
set by individuals on the basis of their intrinsic reward status.
Reinforcement learning, as exemplified by classical condi-
tioning, predicts that subgoals satisfactorily realized in the
course of achieving a parent goal are themselves subject to
reward. In this way, reward-predicting states (subgoals) shift
to become rewards in themselves. The brain thus learns value
proxies for evolutionarily important goals such as food or
sex—and such lower-value goals then receive the neurochem-
ical reward “hit.” Montague (2006) points to the dangers of
this system for establishing and maintaining dysfunctional
behaviors such as ritual hand washing in obsessive-compulsive
disorders. However, by the same token, the system is also
powerful in enabling the production of less dysfunctional, but
perhaps no less ritualistic, behavior patterns. Like both lan-
guage and means-end analysis, this relies on recursion to
achieve its most powerful effects. A goal acts as a reward, and
states associated with the reward (subgoals and operators that
lead directly to the goal) then become reward giving in them-
selves, representing by proxy the reward value of the parent
goal state. Thus, an increased capability to subgoal could lead
to an increased behavioral repertoire by increasing the desire
to meet such subgoals independently of their association with
a parent goal. Montague’s suggestion is that subgoals, or op-
erators, that are reliably associated with a reward signal be-
come an end in themselves. The development of cave art or
music (and even, perhaps, aesthetically pleasing stone tools
or handaxes) may begin as a behavioral pattern that is re-
inforced because of its association with the accomplishment
of other goals (e.g., sexual selection) but rapidly becomes a
goal in itself. This analysis says more about the development
of modern thinking than its origins, but a similar criticism
has been repeatedly made of Darwin’s Origin of Species, which
also speaks to development (by means of evolution) and has
little to say on origins per se. Focusing on possible means of
development might, eventually, yield insights into ultimate
origins. Once it is a goal in its own right, a particular outcome
or behavior pattern can be pursued or repeated at a future
date, subject only to the capacity to maintain multiple goals
and the constraints of mechanisms that exist to preferentially
order goals and activities. If these mechanisms are insufficient,
then these behavior patterns are unsustainable over the long
term. Thus, identifying mechanisms that are necessary to
drive the development of complex behavior also identifies the




The brief review given above provides a flavor of the types
of working-memory or working-attention theories currently
extant within cognitive psychology and considers how the
theoretical constructs involved might have been involved in
later hominid evolution. However, many forms of working
memory are necessary for successful action within a natural
environment (e.g., spatial working memory, yet another form
of working memory, is investigated by researchers examining
the ability of rats to navigate a radial maze), and the inter-
action between the cognitive system and the environment
deserves more consideration than it has traditionally received
within cognitive psychology. The experimental situation that
has given rise to the kinds of theories considered here usually
involves isolating an individual from its peers and examining
its cognitive capabilities while also restricting the tools or
artifacts available. Logistic constraints also mean that exper-
iments typically last under 1 hour. A span task, for example,
will take less than 1 minute per trial to administer, with any-
thing from 15–60 trials being run in a single session. It is
therefore not surprising that much of cognitive psychology
addresses mental operations specific to an individual and last-
ing over very short time spans. Short-term memory, for ex-
ample, is generally considered to last for no more than a few
seconds and is widely studied, but all longer periods of time
are covered by long-term memory with distinctions between
long-term memory of a few days and several years being
drawn only rarely.
In contrast, the data typically considered by archaeologists
are in the form of remnants of material culture, the product
of multiple minds and unknown time spans. One would guess
that in many cases, the operation of mental processes that
produced these artifacts is generally over a greater time period
than those typically studied in the laboratory. Enhanced per-
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sonal short-term memory therefore seems in many ways an
odd thing to propose as a necessary precursor for these ma-
terial products of long-term and collaborative labor. To be
fair, anthropologists recognize the difficulties of inferring cog-
nitive capabilities and process from inanimate artifacts, and
fossils and other methods, such as comparative studies of
nonhuman primate behavior, are well established. For the
emergence of modern thinking, however, the traits used to
identify modern human behavior are primarily inferred either
from artifacts, such as art, ornamentation, blade technologies,
worked bone and antler, complex hearth construction, and
others, or else from necessarily social tasks, such as effective
large-mammal exploitation and expanded exchange networks
(see Henshilwood and Marean 2003, table 1). These are all
equally distant from the situations typically engendered and
examined within the experimental psychology laboratory.
This is as much a problem for the experimental psychologist
as for the cognitive archaeologist.
There has as yet been comparatively little research directly
examining the influence of factors such as short-term memory
or executive attention on vigilance or longer-term concen-
tration (although it is known to affect long-term learning),
but this is certainly an avenue open to exploration. Applying
standard techniques of experimental psychology (e.g., per-
forming under memory loads and other “dual task” manip-
ulations intended to use up particular cognitive resources) to
experimental archaeology (such as flint knapping and the
reproduction of other artifacts) could also go some way to
determining the extent to which, at least among modern hu-
mans, the production of such artifacts benefits from inner
speech capabilities and short-term memories.
In terms of some of the specific ideas advanced here, there
are various ways of shifting from the current “just-so story”
level of theorizing to a real, falsifiable scientific hypothesis on
four different levels. One could examine the coherence of the
subgoaling hypothesis suggested in the latter part of this paper
by running a series of computational studies to determine
whether reinforcing subgoals within an existing cognitive ar-
chitecture (such as ACT-R) is a plausible development of such
architectures. One could also take verbal protocols from, for
example, experienced flint knappers to identify goals and sub-
goals and how they are managed within the design problem
space of lithic tool manufacture. A third suggestion is to search
within the existing fossil record for traces of behavioral pat-
terns that might be usefully described, or redescribed, in in-
formation-processing terms of problem spaces, means-end
analysis, or subgoal resolution, expanding on the approach
earlier applied, rather cursorily, to termite extraction and Ol-
dowan tool manufacture. A final suggestion is that for any
architecture that maps the cognitive components onto a neu-
ral substrate (as later versions of ACT-R do), neural devel-
opment in those brain regions associated with goal selection
and maintenance would be expected and might be looked for
in endocast and other studies (Bruner 2004).
Not all these suggested avenues of study are of equal value,
of course (to an experimental psychologist, duplicating ar-
chaic activities under modern conditions has a distinct ap-
peal), but each would go some way to examining the viability
of the subgoal-reinforcement hypothesis. A similar approach
could be taken with other working-memory hypotheses of
cognitive evolution, provided that the working memory in
question was sufficiently tightly defined a priori.
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